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DOES CONTRACT LAW NEED MORALITY? 
KIMBERLY D. KRAWIEC* 
WENHAO LIU** 
ABSTRACT 
 In The Dignity of Commerce, Nathan Oman sets out an am-
bitious market theory of contract, which he argues is a superior 
normative foundation for contract law than either the moralist or 
economic justifications that currently dominate contract theory. In 
doing so, he sets out a robust defense of commerce and the market-
place as contributing to human flourishing that is a refreshing and 
welcome contribution in an era of market alarmism. But the mar-
ket theory ultimately falls short as either a normative or prescriptive 
theory of contract. The extent to which law, public policy, and the-
ory should account for values other than economic efficiency is a 
longstanding debate. Whatever the merits of that debate, we con-
clude that contract law does not need morality as envisioned by 
Oman—a fluid, subjective, and seemingly instinctual approach to 
the morality of markets. 
                                                                                                            
* Kathrine Robinson Everett Professor of Law, Duke University. 
** Visiting Instructor, Stanford University. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In The Dignity of Commerce, Nathan Oman sets out an am-
bitious market theory of contract (hereinafter Market Theory), 
which he argues is a superior normative foundation for contract 
law than either the moralist or economic justifications that cur-
rently dominate contract theory.1 According to the Market Theory, 
contract law ought to be structured to support well-functioning 
markets because such markets are morally desirable.2 The moral 
virtues of markets thus mark both the purpose and limits of con-
tract law.3 If contract law exists to support well-functioning mar-
kets because such markets are morally valuable, then it follows 
that the law should not support immoral or, as termed by Oman, 
“pernicious” markets.4 
 The significance of this effort should not be understated. A 
clear normative foundation is essential to the understanding and 
application of contract law.5 Only through a theory of why the law 
enforces contracts can one determine, for example, which promises 
should be enforced and which should not, how to calculate damages 
for breach, and the circumstances under which performance will 
be excused.6 The Dignity of Commerce thus confronts questions 
that are both theoretically difficult and of practical importance to 
courts and lawmakers. 
I. THE DIGNITY OF MARKETS (AND CONTRACT) 
 One of the book’s most important contributions is its em-
phasis on the positive role played by markets and thus, by exten-
sion, of contracts.7 In an era rife with warnings about the market’s 
dangers to society,8 Oman’s cogent reminder of the market’s benefits 
is both refreshing and welcome. Oman also correctly emphasizes 
                                                                                                            
1 NATHAN B. OMAN, THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE 21 (2016). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 8. 
4 Id. at 160. 
5 See ERIC A. POSNER, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 227 (2d ed. 2016). 
6 Id. 
7 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 23. 
8 E.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF 
MARKETS 11–12 (2012). 
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contract law’s important contribution to proper market function-
ing.9 Although this point is recognized in economic treatments of 
contract law,10 Oman argues that it has not been accorded suffi-
cient attention, by either economic or moralist theories of contract.11 
 Less recognized in the literature is the market’s (and, there-
fore, contract’s) often forgotten role in organizing productive social 
interactions, and it is here that Oman’s treatment really shines.12 
These social benefits, Oman argues, are so important that it is 
these benefits—rather than a commitment to markets in and of 
themselves—that justify the use of state resources to support mar-
kets, and thus contracts.13 
 The Dignity of Commerce is descriptive, normative, and pre-
scriptive all at once. This is both a strength and weakness of the 
book. Oman’s account is, at least in theory, more comprehensive 
than the competing theories he seeks to replace. Both moralist and 
economic justifications for contract law have, for example, been 
criticized as providing a poor, or at least incomplete, descriptive 
account of contract law.14 Oman’s descriptive account, by recog-
nizing that conceptions of morality and blameworthiness impact 
contract law, provides a descriptively more appealing account than 
theories that contend that contract law is explained solely by eco-
nomic considerations or solely by moral ones.15 
 But this insight is not new. Practitioners of law and econom-
ics have long recognized that judges and lawmakers, being largely 
                                                                                                            
9 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 16. 
10 See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1115, 
1152 (1998) (explaining how third-party enforcement of contracts facilitates the 
emergence of sophisticated capital markets); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Wenhao Liu, 
& Marc L. Melcher, Contract Development in a Matching Market: The Case of Kid-
ney Exchange, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 20 (2017) (discussing the posi-
tive role played by contracts in various markets, including matching markets). 
11 OMAN, supra note 1, at 13. 
12 See id. at 11, 15. 
13 Id. at 15. 
14 See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philos-
ophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 489–91 (1989) (arguing that moralist 
theories of contract are irrelevant to wide swaths of contract law, including the 
choice of default rule); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After 
Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 830 (arguing that law 
and economics has failed to provide plausible descriptive theories of many im-
portant contract law doctrines). 
15 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 11. 
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untrained in economics, are likely to rely on moral intuitions 
when reaching results.16 And Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholars 
long have insisted on the indeterminacy of contract law, arguing 
that contract law outcomes are best explained as a reflection of 
cultural values, as operationalized by powerful decision makers.17 
 The Market Theory is less successful as a normative or pre-
scriptive theory, however. As we will show, Oman makes moral 
judgments about the validity of certain markets (and, therefore, 
certain contracts) without providing a theoretical framework to 
replace either the moralist or economic theories he rejects.18 As a 
result, the Market Theory fails to provide meaningful guidance to 
courts, policymakers, or scholars confronted with the more diffi-
cult questions facing contract law.19 
II. THE LIMITS OF MARKETS (AND CONTRACT) 
 Under the Market Theory, contract law exists to strengthen 
and support markets.20 However, markets are not ends in them-
selves.21 Instead, the law supports markets only because and to 
the extent that markets provide other moral virtues.22 Therefore, 
unlike the economic analysis of law that it seeks to replace, the 
Market Theory of contract is deeply interested in normative ques-
tions of morality.23 According to Oman: 
Markets can be evil. Just as well-functioning markets have im-
portant moral consequences, pernicious markets can cause harm, 
destroy valuable social and personal goods, and invade aspects 
of life that should be separated from commerce. ... [P]ernicious 
markets mark the limits of contract law. If contract law ought 
to be structured to support well-functioning markets because such 
markets are morally valuable, it follows that, when markets 
are pernicious, the justification for contract law fails—or at the 
                                                                                                            
16 POSNER, supra note 5, at 233. 
17 See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, A Critical Legal Studies Perspective on Con-
tract Law and Practice, ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 257 (“Legal decisions are guided 
by the invisible hand of our complex cultural values, operating through their 
embodiment in our social decision makers.”). 
18 See infra text accompanying notes 56–61. 
19 See infra text accompanying notes 42?48. 
20 OMAN, supra note 1, at 16. 
21 See id. at 15. 
22 Id. at 16. 
23 See id. at 11, 16. 
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very least weakens dramatically. The market argument thus ac-
counts for the universal limitations that we observe in all legal 
systems on the enforcement of contracts. It also focuses our at-
tention on the question that we must ask in order to understand 
the limits of contract law: When are markets pernicious?24 
 For reasons that we detail below, however, the concept of 
“pernicious markets” has been widely contested.25 Indeed, entire 
books challenge the premise that market trading can introduce 
wrongs into a previously unproblematic activity.26 Some activities 
or actions may be pernicious, of course, particularly when they 
impose harm on third parties.27 The law discourages many of 
these activities by making them illegal. But this is a statement 
about the evils of the underlying activity, rather than a statement 
about the evils of a particular market.28 
 As we will show in Sections A–B, Oman’s purported examples 
of evil markets are actually examples of evil activities (although, 
as we detail in Sections B–C, Oman provides no criteria for deter-
mining the evilness of any given activity).29 Accordingly, the mar-
ket argument does not delineate the limits of contract, nor can it 
“account for universal limitations that we observe in all legal sys-
tems on the enforcement of contracts[,]” except perhaps to say that 
contract enforcement depends on the prevailing norms, prejudices, 
and culture of the relevant legal regime.30 
A. Evil Markets Versus Evil Activity: Slavery 
 Oman invokes the example of involuntary servitude and of 
the Atlantic slave trade, in particular, a number of times as an 
                                                                                                            
24 Id. at 160–61 (emphasis added). 
25 See, e.g., JASON BRENNAN & PETER M. JAWORSKI, MARKETS WITHOUT 
LIMITS: MORAL VIRTUES AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS 16, 18, 92–93 (2016) (arguing 
that the market does not transform moral acts into immoral ones); Kimberly 
D. Krawiec, Foreword: Show Me the Money: Making Markets in Forbidden Ex-
change, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. i, vi (2009) (demonstrating the cultural 
and historical dependence of views regarding which items properly “belong” in 
the marketplace). 
26 See generally BRENNAN & JAWORSKI, supra note 25. 
27 See infra text accompanying notes 33–35. 
28 See infra Section II.A. 
29 See infra Sections II.A–C. 
30 OMAN, supra note 1, at 160–61. 
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illustration of a morally evil market that contract law should not 
support.31 According to Oman: 
The Atlantic slave trade is one of the great moral catastrophes 
of history. Its scale and the brutality of its conditions, for ex-
ample, dwarf other instances of human slavery. Unlike trage-
dies such as the Holocaust or the mass murders perpetrated by 
Stalin, Mao, and Pol Pot, the slave trade was fundamentally a 
market atrocity. ... It provides the best historical example of a 
pernicious market. Whatever benefits the commerce in humans 
might have conferred on merchants or planters, it cannot erase 
the human misery and degradation wrought by the slave trade. 
Given the evils of such a market, the law should not have sup-
ported it. Accordingly, one should not enforce contracts for the 
sale of slaves.32 
 Yet, Oman’s slavery example tells us very little about the 
limits of markets or of contract law, because slavery is an example 
of a pernicious practice, not a pernicious market. Forced slavery 
is almost universally considered wrong, not because of market 
trading, but because to own another human being is inconsistent 
with basic morality and human rights.33 This conclusion is not 
dependent on the existence of market trading in slaves and would 
hold even if the law prohibited the sale of slaves but permitted 
their acquisition and ownership through other means. If, for ex-
ample, slaves could be inherited, but not sold, or if a society were 
to permit the gifting of slaves to commemorate holidays and birth-
days, but banned the commercial slave trade, no dominant moral 
theory would suggest that the absence of market trading renders 
slavery moral.34 
 This is because slavery is an immoral practice, without re-
gard to the presence or absence of market trading. If it is immoral 
to own slaves, gift slaves, or devise slaves by will, then it follows 
that it is also immoral to trade in slaves and, it logically follows, 
that such contracts should not be enforced. But notice that this 
conclusion has nothing to do with slavery as a market. To be sure, 
                                                                                                            
31 Id. at 163. 
32 Id. (emphasis added). 
33 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 4 
(Dec. 10, 1948). 
34 Id. (prohibiting both the slave trade and the holding of another in servi-
tude or slavery). 
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there is somewhat more debate surrounding the morality of vol-
untary servitude, such as bonded labor.35 But this is not the debate 
on which Oman relies for insights about the limits of markets, 
invoking instead the example of the Atlantic slave trade.36 
 A few examples will highlight the difference between forced 
slavery and transactions that are not considered immoral in the 
absence of commercial trading. There are certain items and activ-
ities whose exchange is not only permitted, but applauded, when 
motivated by a purpose other than profit-seeking—love, altruism, 
kindness, or a sense of duty, for example.37 In fact, a failure to 
provide these goods and services in the context of certain relation-
ships may be condemned as selfish or self-indulgent.38 A decision 
to carry and give birth to a child for my infertile sister is likely to 
be lauded as compassionate and charitable.39 A failure to donate 
a life-saving kidney to my dying brother will strike some as inex-
cusably selfish. Selling either in a commercial transaction is mor-
ally contested and often illegal.40 In each case, it is the involvement 
of the market that generates discomfort with the transaction, rather 
than the transaction itself. 
 Oman seems to believe that because the marketplace exac-
erbated slavery’s evils, “the slave trade was fundamentally a market 
atrocity.”41 But the simple exercise of questioning whether we would 
approve of slavery in the absence of market trading suggests that 
this is not the case. And a new and elaborate market-based theory 
of contract is unnecessary to reach that result. 
B. The Digital Pedophile and the Indebted Gambler 
 Like slavery, the digital pedophile is an example that Oman 
frequently invokes as an example of an evil market that contract 
law should not support.42 Says Oman: 
                                                                                                            
35 See generally DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE, 
Ch. 8 (2010) (detailing this debate). 
36 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 163–64. 
37 Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1740 (2010). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 1741 (discussing the taboo nature of commercial surrogacy). 
40 Kieran Healy & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Repugnance Management and Trans-
actions in the Body, 107 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 86, 86–87 (2017). 
41 OMAN, supra note 1, at 163. 
42 Id. at 12. 
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[T]he satisfaction of evil preferences is not morally desirable. The 
world is not better if a twisted sadist can indulge his desire to 
watch violent child pornography, even if no children are harmed 
and the twisted sadist’s actions have no other third-party effects.43 
 As Oman recognizes, traditional economic analysis would 
consider this transaction welfare enhancing, under the conditions 
specified by Oman—the sadist is made better off, and no one else 
is made worse off.44 The digital pedophile’s actions are thus Pareto 
improving. Indeed, Oman specifically invokes the digital pedo-
phile example to illustrate what he perceives as a central flaw in 
the economic theory of contract—its lack of attention to questions 
of morality.45 
 But Oman never explains why the world is not better off if 
the twisted sadist can satisfy his preferences with no negative 
third-party effects, simply asserting it as if the answer is obvious.46 
But the answer is far from obvious. Indeed, even the U.S. Su-
preme Court struggled with this question, before declaring a statute 
prohibiting digital, or virtual, child pornography unconstitutional.47 
 For many theorists, of course, efficiency is not the only, or 
even the primary, relevant criterion for judging the value of any 
particular market or transaction.48 But, a rigorous debate about 
whether the world is made better off by the satisfaction of a digi-
tal pedophile’s preferences needs to be grounded on some evalua-
tion criteria. Because the Market Theory provides no normative 
basis for reaching its determination that digital child pornography 
                                                                                                            
43 Id. 
44 POSNER, supra note 5, at 230–32 (discussing Pareto efficiency). 
45 OMAN, supra note 1, at 12. 
46 See id. 
47 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255–56 (2002). In reaching its 
decision the Court concluded: 
[T]he CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime and creates no victims 
by its production. Virtual child pornography is not “intrinsically related” to the 
sexual abuse of children. While the Government asserts that the images can lead 
to actual instances of child abuse, the causal link is contingent and indirect. 
Id. at 250. Six years later, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Con-
gressional response to the Free Speech Coalition ruling, The Prosecutorial Reme-
dies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003. 
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008). 
48 See, e.g., SATZ, supra note 35, at 182 (discussing the limits of efficiency as 
a gauge for determining the desirability of many transactions). 
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is an evil market not worth supporting, it provides no guidance on 
how courts would, or should, address other transactions in which 
neither third parties nor the participants to the contract are harmed. 
 A similar problem arises in Oman’s treatment of gambling. 
According to Oman, Nevada, though famous for gambling and ca-
sinos, refuses to enforce contracts creating gambling debts.49 Oman 
speaks with seeming approval of Nevada’s policy, noting: 
Nevada does not take a paternalistic attitude toward gambling. 
If its citizens (or visitors from other states) wish to gamble, Nevada 
does not prohibit them from doing so. It does not follow from this, 
however, that Nevada must enforce their contracts. ... The litigant 
calling on the state to enforce a contract is not asking to be left 
free from interference in his or her private decisions. Rather, he 
or she is asking that the government act to support the market 
that will be strengthened by the enforcement of the contract.50 
 Oman is, of course, correct that the mere fact that Nevada 
permits gambling does not require it to enforce gambling contracts. 
At common law, cash settled forward contracts were legal, but 
unenforceable, precisely on the theory that they were speculative 
contracts, akin to gambling.51 Today a number of states permit 
gestational surrogacy arrangements, but refuse to enforce surro-
gacy contracts.52 
 But Oman provides no justification to support Nevada’s 
policy.53 Thus the Market Theory, rather than providing a predic-
tive framework for understanding contract, instead seems to sug-
gest that communities will enforce contracts when they believe that 
the underlying behavior is worthy and will fail to do so when they 
disapprove of the underlying behavior. 
                                                                                                            
49 OMAN, supra note 1, at 164. 
50 Id. at 165. 
51 Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private 
Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 714–15 (1998). 
52 The Center for American Progress provides a summary of surrogacy laws 
by jurisdiction, showing that some states ban the practice (sometimes with criminal 
penalties and sometimes not) and others simply declare surrogacy contracts void 
and unenforceable as against public policy. Center for American Progress, Guide 
to State Surrogacy Laws (Dec. 17, 2007), https://www.american-progress.org/issues 
/women/news/2007/12/17/3758/guide-to-state-surrogacy-laws/ [https://perma.cc 
/L4HW-5HJ2]. 
53 OMAN, supra note 1, at 165. 
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 This may indeed be true as a descriptive matter, but is not 
novel—as already noted, adherents of both law and economics and 
CLS have recognized this feature of the law.54 More importantly, 
however, the distinction does not appear to be about supporting 
markets. Oman never argues, for example, that gambling markets 
fail to provide the social benefits he extols in The Dignity of Commerce 
or provides any other reason for Nevada’s decision that would lend 
certainty to cases going forward.55 
C. Taboo Markets 
 So far, we have shown that the Market Theory, by claiming 
to draw the line at immoral markets without providing a coherent 
theory by which to judge that immorality, falls short as both a nor-
mative and prescriptive theory of contract law.56 In an age of in-
creasing market skepticism, this is a disappointment. Numerous 
books, academic articles, and popular press pieces have emerged 
in recent years lamenting a perceived expansion of markets and 
identifying dozens, if not hundreds, of potentially pernicious mar-
kets.57 The most prominent voice is perhaps that of Michael Sandel, 
whose New York Times bestseller identifies markets in prison cells, 
car pool lanes, international surrogacy, rights to shoot endangered 
species, concierge medicine, carbon emissions, university legacy ad-
missions, military force, line standing, book reading, and dozens of 
other “new” markets as potentially pernicious.58 
 A Market Theory that celebrated the positive attributes of 
markets, as The Dignity of Commerce surely does, while providing 
guidance on the appropriate limits of the marketplace would be a 
welcome contribution to the literature. Unfortunately, Oman’s Mar-
ket Theory tells us very little about these and other contested 
                                                                                                            
54 POSNER, supra note 5, at 233; Spann, supra note 17, at 257. 
55 OMAN, supra note 1, at 165. 
56 Supra Sections II.A?B. 
57 See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 8, at 3?5 (2012) (detailing a number of po-
tentially pernicious markets). 
58 Id. at 15. We label such markets “new” because, despite Sandel’s claims 
of novelty, at least some of the markets identified by Sandel, such as surrogacy, 
sex work, and mercenaries, are not new at all, while others simply take on a new 
form, as technological or other changes permit forms of commerce not possible 
before. See, e.g., Krawiec, supra note 37, at 1742, 1747, 1747 n.23 (discussing 
modern variations on ancient markets). 
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markets, as fully highlighted in the book’s final chapter, which 
addresses pernicious markets.59 
 Given the prior discussion of gambling contracts and digital 
pedophiles in Section II.B, one might expect Oman to view tradi-
tional taboo markets—such as those for surrogacy services, sex work, 
and human bodily materials—with skepticism.60 After all, these are 
unquestionably controversial exchanges, criticized by observers 
around the world and prohibited in many jurisdictions. But this 
does not appear to be the case.61 In discussing surrogacy contracts, 
for example, Oman notes that “[w]e no longer need to speculate 
about the social effects of surrogacy agreements. Such contracts 
will be honored in at least some states, and we now have more than 
a generation of experience with their effects. The dystopian, com-
modified future feared by Radin has not materialized.”62 
 To be sure, we agree with Oman’s analysis of the evidence 
on surrogacy arrangements and with his conclusions. Our point 
is simply that his analysis is inconsistent with the discussion of 
gambling and digital pedophiles detailed in Section II.B. Recall 
that in the case of digital pedophiles, Oman condemned the market 
as immoral, without respect to the costs and benefits of the behav-
ior.63 Yet, in the case of surrogacy contracts, Oman urges us to 
consider evidence of the market’s costs and benefits.64 Moreover, 
Oman seems to overlook what is, to surrogacy critics, the most seri-
ous objection to commercial surrogacy and other taboo trades—
the corrupting effect on social values.65 Such costs are amorphous 
and not easily identified or measured. Surrogacy critics would thus 
deny that the evidence proves such fears unfounded. 
 To reiterate, we agree with Oman’s approach to surrogacy 
contracts and other taboo markets. But then we would also enforce 
                                                                                                            
59 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 160. 
60 See supra Section II.B. 
61 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 170–71. 
62 Id. at 171. 
63 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 12. 
64 Id. at 171–72. 
65 MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES xiii, 142–43 (1996) (ar-
guing that commercial surrogacy is commodifying, reinforces a gender hierar-
chy and corrupts parent-child relationships more generally); ELIZABETH ANDERSON, 
VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 168 (1993) (“[c]ontract pregnancy commodi-
fies both women’s labor and children in ways that undermine the autonomy 
and dignity of women and the love parents owe to children.”) 
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contracts for digital pornography, assuming the lack of negative 
externalities posited by Oman. But for opponents of taboo mar-
kets, such as Margaret Radin, Elizabeth Anderson, and Michael 
Sandel, the objections to surrogacy and other taboo markets are 
similar, if not identical, to the objections to digital child pornog-
raphy—that it corrupts and demeans not only the participants to 
the transaction, but society more generally.66 Oman’s apparent 
rejection of these concerns reinforces our sense that his metrics 
for judging the immorality of markets and transactions are fluid 
and, perhaps, idiosyncratic. Society’s collective attitude towards 
any activity, and its collective attitude towards markets in any 
activity, varies across cultures and time.67 But our sense is that the 
Market Theory seeks to do more than suggest that contract dis-
putes are often resolved against these background cultural norms. If 
that is correct, then the Market Theory must articulate some sys-
tematic and consistent principles in order to succeed as a prescriptive 
theory of contract. 
CONCLUSION 
 The Dignity of Commerce is an important book on an im-
portant topic. Indeed, one of us (Krawiec) has adopted the book as 
required reading in an Advanced Contracts course for two straight 
years. Moreover, The Dignity of Commerce is particularly timely. 
We live in a time during which the definition of what constitutes 
a market has become broader than ever and the number of goods 
and services distributed through market forces appears to increase 
almost daily.68 These changes are enabled partly by advances in 
economic theories and partly by modern technology.69 But regard-
less of the underlying drivers, markets play an increasingly sig-
nificant role in our social and economic activities, replacing some 
activities traditionally facilitated by idiosyncratic individual efforts, 
and kindness or altruism. 
                                                                                                            
66 See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 65, at 133; ANDERSON, supra note 65, at 148; 
SANDEL, supra note 8, at 95. 
67 Alvin E. Roth, Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 
37, 37–58 (discussing a variety of “repugnant activities” and the impact of peo-
ple’s repugnance on the underlying markets). 
68 ALVIN E. ROTH, WHO GETS WHAT—AND WHY: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF 
MATCHMAKING AND MARKET DESIGN 15, 20?22, 225 (2015). 
69 See, e.g., id. at 15, 20?23, 225 (discussing these developments). 
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 These changes are alarming to many observers, who believe 
that they conflict with traditional moral intuitions and threaten 
to displace nonmarket values and ideals.70 Seen in this context, 
Oman’s robust defense of commerce and the marketplace as con-
tributing to human flourishing is a refreshing and welcome con-
tribution.71 Yet, Oman’s Market Theory, which he argues is superior 
to the moralist and economic philosophies that currently dominate 
contract theory, is ultimately unsuccessful on its own terms.72 To 
be sure, devising a new theory of contract law is no easy feat, and 
we applaud the effort. But the Market Theory ultimately falls 
short as either a normative or prescriptive theory of contract. 
 To return to the question with which we began, does con-
tract law need morality? This, of course, is an old debate that ex-
tends well beyond normative theories of contract law. 73 The extent 
to which law, public policy, and theory should account for values 
other than economic efficiency is a longstanding debate, and one 
we need not resolve here.74 Instead, we merely conclude that con-
tract law does not need morality as envisioned by Oman—a fluid, 
subjective, and seemingly instinctual approach to the morality of 
markets. Although the “I know it when I see it” approach to mo-
rality may accurately describe the way courts and lawmakers ap-
proach difficult questions of contract law, it has little to do with 
supporting the moral virtues of markets and fails to provide a 
prescriptive theory to guide future cases.75 
                                                                                                            
70 E.g., RADIN, supra note 65, at 142–43; ANDERSON, supra note 65, at 168. 
71 OMAN, supra note 1, at 125. 
72 See, e.g., id. at 8, 11, 16. 
73 E.g., SATZ, supra note 35, at 182 (rejecting efficiency as the sole measure 
of the assessment of a market); POSNER, supra note 5, at 229–34 (discussing this 
debate within contract law). 
74 Id. 
75 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
